Former President John Dramani Mahama has been confirmed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) as “Government official 1” in the infamous Airbus bribery scandal.
Special Prosecutor (SP) Kissi Agyebeng who confirmed the already known fact, said this conclusion followed extensive investigation spanning four years by his office.
Addressing the media on the scandal in Accra yesterday, Mr. Agyebeng explained that the investigation into the infamous case and the revelation of the identities of the persons involved were necessary due to the public interest in the issue.
“The individual described as ‘Government Official 1’ by the UK court and ‘Individual 1’ by the US court is John Dramani Mahama. He is a citizen of Ghana; he was the Vice President of Ghana from 7th January 2009 to 2012. The President of Ghana from 2012 to 7th January 2017. His tenure of office as the Vice President coincided with the time-frame of the UK and US investigation of the first airbus campaign into the sale of 2C295 aircraft to Ghana.
“His term of office as the President of Ghana occurred during the UK-US investigation time frame of the second airbus campaign for the sale of 1C29 aircraft to Ghana,” Mr. Agyebeng further established.
His followed a similar assertion made by Ghana’s first Special Prosecutor, Mr. Martin Amidu.
Supposed exoneration
In his media briefing, the Special Prosecutor claimed there was nothing to show that former President Mahama was paid any bribes.
However, evidence before the Crown Court at Southwark, UK, and deferred document from US on the Airbus scandal does not support the whitewashing claims by Ghana’s Special Prosecutor.
Both the UK and US courts also indicated that Consultant 4 (Intermediary 5) was used as conduit to get through to ‘Government Official 1’.
According to paragraph 136 of the US deferred judgment, Airbus used consultant 4 (Adams Mahama), younger brother of Mr John Mahama, to pay €3.5 million in bribes to Ghanaian officials including Government Official 1.
Perusing all the court documents, it will be noted that the OSP did not conduct the actual investigations and so cannot be the source of original information.
All the countries that conducted the actual investigations are the only genuine source to make any such identification of persons and determine bribery or NOT.
The UK and US courts have clearly pronounced that the payments were intended to induce or reward “improper favour” by ‘Government Official 1’ towards Airbus.
It must be noted that Airbus agreed that all the charges of bribery and statement of facts were true and accurate, culminating in the biggest European aircraft manufacturer being slapped with a fine of £5 billion by the UK court in lieu of prosecution.
Background
Ghana is one of five countries in which the European aviation giant, Airbus, paid or attempted to pay millions of euros/dollars in bribes in exchange for contracts, leading a court in Britain to slap a fine of £5 billion on the company.
In court documents and hearings, Airbus admitted five counts of failing to prevent bribery, using a network of secret agents to pay large-scale backhanders to officials in foreign countries, including Ghana, to land high-value contracts.
According to the report, there are six key actors involved in the scandal regarding Ghana.
Investigators from the UK’s SFO identified them only as Government Official 1 (high ranking and elected), Intermediary 5 (British national and close relative of Government Official 1), Company D (corporate vehicle for Intermediary 5 – shareholder), Intermediary 6 (British national and associate of Intermediary 5), Intermediary 7 (British national and associate of Intermediary 5), as well as Intermediary 8 (Spanish company and front for Intermediary 5).
Other British citizens; Philip Sean Middlemiss; Sarah Davis and Sarah Furneaux are connected to the case for their roles in the scandal.
Below are excerpts on Ghana:
COUNT 5 (GHANA)
Statement of Offence
Failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery, contrary to Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010
Particulars of Offence
Between 1 July 2011 and 1 June 2015 Airbus SE failed to prevent persons associated with Airbus SE from bribing others concerned with the purchase of military transport aircraft by the Government of Ghana, where the said bribery was intended to obtain or retain business or advantage in the conduct of business for Airbus SE.
Summary
Between 2009 and 2015 an Airbus defence company engaged Intermediary 5, a close relative of a high ranking elected Ghanaian Government official (Government Official 1), as its BP in respect of the proposed sale of three aircraft to the Government of Ghana. A number of Airbus employees knew that Intermediary 5 was a close relative of Government Official 1, a key decision maker in respect of the sales. A number of Airbus employees made or promised success based commission payments of approximately €5 million to Intermediary 5.
False documentation was created by or with the agreement of Airbus employees in order to support and disguise these payments. The payments were intended to induce or reward improper favour by the Government Official 1 towards Airbus.
FACTS
A. Introduction
Airbus (through one of its Spanish defence subsidiaries) conducted two campaigns to sell its C-295 military transport aircraft to the Government of Ghana. The “First Campaign” ran between 2009 and 2011 and the “Second Campaign” between 2013 and 2015. Intermediary 5 acted as Airbus’ BP in both these campaigns.
Government Official 1 was a key decision maker in respect of Government of Ghana aircraft orders.
Intermediary 5 is a UK national born in Ghana. He was brought to the United Kingdom as a young child and lost touch with his Ghanaian family until the late 1990s. He had no prior experience or expertise in the aerospace industry. A “CV” provided to Airbus in 2011 listed Intermediary 5’s employment before 2009 as an events manager for a local authority, director of a football merchandising company and facilities manager for an estate management business.
Intermediary 5 was assisted in his Airbus work by two other UK nationals: Intermediary 6 and Intermediary 7. Intermediary 6 has publicly described Intermediary 5 as his “best friend”. There is no evidence which suggests that either Intermediary 6 or Intermediary 7 had any prior experience or expertise in the aerospace industry. A CV that Intermediary 6 provided to Airbus in 2011 listed his pre 2009 employment as a UK television actor and film director.
Intermediary 7 was also a former UK television actor.
Contact between Airbus and the Government of Ghana about aircraft sales began in June 2009 following an expression of interest by the Government of Ghana.
By August 2009 Airbus employee 15 [senior] (Airbus SMO International) reported that he was in touch with Government Official 1 and ‘his team’.
Airbus employee 16 was the Spanish sales person responsible for First and Second Campaigns. On 10 October 2009 Airbus employee 15 [senior] emailed Airbus employee 16, part of which translates as follows:
“Our potential friends are at Accra next week. You can call [Intermediary 5] [2 phone numbers] on my behalf. He will wait for your call..”
On 7 December 2009, a Company of Intermediary 5 and 6 (hereafter Company D) was incorporated in Ghana. Company D’s “CV” submitted by Intermediary 6 to Airbus in June 2011 stated that Intermediary 5 and Intermediary 6 were its directors. A company of the same name was incorporated in the UK in February 2010. Company D was the corporate vehicle through which Intermediary 5 and his associates provided services to Airbus.
In January 2010 Airbus employee 16 was made aware that Intermediary 6 and Intermediary 5 were or had recently been working for Government Official 1 and/or the Government of Ghana.
B. The Aircraft Orders
C. The Payments
Between March 2012 and February 2014, Airbus paid €3,909,756 to a third-party Company, Intermediary 8. Intermediary 8 paid €3,850,115 to Company D. In respect of the Second Campaign Intermediary 5 or Company D were promised approximately €1,675,000 but this money was not paid.
The First Campaign
From 2009, Intermediary 5 and his associates worked on the sales to the Government of Ghana without any written consultant agreement. This included liaison with Government Official 1 regarding the potential Airbus C-295 sale.
Intermediary 5 and Intermediary 6 submitted a report to Airbus which documented a January 2011 meeting in London attended by themselves, the Government Official 1 and Airbus at which the C-295 was agreed upon as the most suitable aircraft for the Government of Ghana’s needs.
By April 2011 Airbus employee 16 reported to his Airbus colleagues that the deal was close to being finalised. Airbus employee 16 then asked Intermediary 5 and Intermediary 6 to transmit a letter to Government Official 1 and explain a possible delay. Airbus employee 16 also asked them to secure meetings with the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance. On 18 May 2011 Intermediary 6 emailed Airbus employee 16 stating that Government Official 1 had taken the
relevant financials to the Minister of Finance and that Intermediary 6 and Intermediary 5 were planning to go to Ghana within the next couple of weeks:
“so as we can oversee the project personally!”.
Company D submitted a formal BP application in May 2011. On 8 July 2011 Intermediary 6 sent Airbus employee 15 [senior] a ‘[Company D] update’.
He reported that he had just returned from Ghana “having had very productive meetings with all parties, including [Government Official, the MOD and Minister of Finance”. The email stated that the C-295 sale was agreed at all levels, was expected to clear Parliament by 14 July 2011, and that Government Official 1 had expressed an interest in buying two more C-295 aircraft.
On 3 August 2011, Airbus’ Spanish Defence Subsidiary and the Government of Ghana signed a purchase agreement for the sale of the two C-295 aircraft. The following day Airbus employee 17 [senior] (Airbus Compliance) declared to the
Spanish ECA that no more than €3,001,718.15 would be paid to BPs in connection with this contract. Although no payment had actually yet been made, this figure broadly reflected a 5% commission. The same document also declared compliance with the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
Following the May 2011, BP application, Airbus commissioned an external due diligence report on Company D. The resulting report dated 30 September 2011 identified Intermediary 5 as a shareholder and the possibility that he was a close
relative of Government Official 1. The source of the information was a UK newspaper article quoting Intermediary.
The external due diligence report raised concerns that there was a risk of non-conformity with the OECD Convention.
The Company D application was discussed in an email chain commencing 5 October 2011:
a) Airbus employee 18 (Airbus SMO International, compliance) emailed Airbus employee 15 [senior], Airbus employee 19 (Airbus Compliance), Airbus employee 17 [senior] (responsible for the 4 August 2011 declaration above) and others and copied to Airbus employee 20 (Airbus SMO International, compliance). He explained that shareholders of Company D were “so close to the decision makers that we put the file on hold for the moment”.
b) Airbus employee 15 [senior] responded to the compliance employees requesting a discussion. Airbus employee 17 [senior] suggested an in person meeting with Airbus employee 18 in Paris the following week.
c) The next day Airbus employee 15 [senior] replied to the compliance employees and now also Airbus employee 16:
“I read the conclusion of the audit yesterday and its final…I talked to the british shareholder to explain the situation. So we face to a big pb which could impact on the commercial discussion on the ground. I don’t know if they will be able to
give us another reliable company. They will call me back tomorrow.”
d) Airbus employee 16 responded to Airbus employee 15 [senior] and the Airbus employee 17 [senior], copied to other compliance employees and Airbus employee 21 [senior], that this was the worst situation and a solution had to be found. His email stated that he was in Ghana and awaiting the last document needed for the credit agreement and for the contract signed on 3 August. He went on (sic):
“I really don’t know what will hapend in the next two hours but even if this project enter into force, without solution, anyone in this group will have the opportunity to make business in this country for years”.
e) This final Airbus employee 16 email recorded his view that absent a solution to the failure of the Company D application, Airbus would be prevented from doing business in Ghana for a number of years.
On 20 October 2011 Airbus employee 15 [senior] emailed Airbus employee 16, Airbus employee 17 [senior], Airbus employee 20 and Airbus employee 18:
“In order to find a “smoth” (sic) solution to solve this issue, I suggest to move trough (sic) a third part (sic), somebody well known, audited and already engaged with us in the same area”.
On 22 October 2011 Airbus employee 15 [senior] emailed further, stating he had met Intermediary 7 in Manchester but it was not easy for them to “find a new company”.
The third party selected was a Spanish company, Intermediary 8, a pre-existing Airbus BP. Airbus employees involved in the ‘smoth solution email’ above (the recipients of which included subsidiary and SMO International compliance personnel) agreed to deliberately circumvent the proper compliance process by falsely representing that the work in respect of the First Campaign had been done by this company, who could in turn then make the money available to Intermediary 5 and others. Intermediary 8 had no previous links or experience of working in Ghana for any Airbus entity.
In January 2012, Airbus employee 16 sent an email to Airbus employee 19 attaching an Intermediary 8 BP application for Ghana. The new Intermediary 8 application was very similar to the earlier one submitted by Company D.
On 18 January 2012 Intermediary 6 sent Airbus employee 15 [senior] and Airbus employee 16 a report of work done from August 2009 onwards to secure the 2011 C-295 sales. The same report was emailed by Intermediary 5 to Airbus employee 16 that day. The report falsely presented that work as having been done by a company with a name very similar to a subsidiary of Intermediary 8. The report described meetings and discussions with Government Official 1 and others. In the report the author claimed that “after numerous interventions from [Government Official 1] on our behalf” the signature of the contract had been enabled by the
end of July 2011. Intermediary 5 or his associates were not named in the report.
On 19 March 2012 Airbus employee 1 [senior] and Airbus employee 22 [senior] (Airbus SMO International, compliance) approved the Intermediary 8 BP application for the First Campaign. The approval memo stated that:
“As per Consultant Application, the Consultant has already rendered services during 2010 and 2011 under a verbal agreement, it is recommended to obtain all reporting related to that period prior to any payment to the Consultant”
The consultant agreement between Intermediary 8 and Airbus was dated 20 March 2012 but said to be effective from 1 January 2010. The agreement provided for a percentage commission fee of the net total amount received by Airbus by virtue of any commercial contract with the Government of Ghana for C-295 aircraft.
Between March 2012 and February 2014, Airbus paid Intermediary 8 a total of €3,909,756.85, a sum in excess of the agreed commission amount as per the ECA declaration (€3,001,718.15).
Between 10 April 2012 and 31 July 2013 Intermediary 8 paid €3,850,115 to Company D. Intermediary 8 retained about €60,000.
