Ghana’s leading opposition Party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), appears to be struggling to raise funds to prosecute the Party’s 2024 campaign; a situation that has seen a dip in the party’s campaign activities.
While the NPP, led by its flagbearer has earnestly begun the campaign to sell its message to Ghanaians across the country, followers of the NDC still doubt the direction of the Party’s campaign, thus occasioning apprehension among the rank and file of the Party’s base.
Meanwhile, in a desperate move by the NDC to raise funds, some party officials led by John Dramani Mahama, flagbearer of the Party, have clandestinely travelled to Moscow, the capital of Russia to meet some Russian Oligarchs to finance the Party’s campaign, under the guise of launching the Russian edition of his Book, “My First Coup D’etat”.
Worrying, is the fact that the former president appears to be on a promising spree in Moscow; mortgaging Ghana’s future to foreign interests. So far, available information has revealed that he has been assuring some Russian businesses of juicy government contracts as a quid pro quo for their help in winning the elections.
It is worthy of note that former president has a strong Russian network of friends, given his status as an alumnus of the Institute of Social Science in Moscow.
Engaging with Russian oligarchs, particularly under opaque circumstances, positions Ghana within a larger Russian strategy aimed at expanding its influence across Africa.
Russia has notably increased its presence in Africa by offering military aid and political consultancy through Wagner Group and other entities.
By potentially aligning with Russia, Ghana could unwittingly become a pawn in Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, which often prioritize the Russian state interests over local stability.
In Africa, Russia’s modus operandi has often been to support regimes in exchange for access to natural resources and strategic military positioning. The fear is that a similar scenario could unfold in Ghana. This approach is visible in the Central African Republic and Sudan, where Russian involvement has led to an increase in internal violence and instability.
The West African subregion is currently dealing with the repercussions of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russian involvement in these countries, primarily through military support, has shifted the balance of power, often sidelining efforts by ECOWAS to restore democratic governance.
If Ghana, traditionally a pillar of stability and democracy in West Africa, tilts towards Russia, it could undermine ECOWAS’s diplomatic leverage and embolden military juntas within the region. This shift could lead to a domino effect, signalling the weakening of democratic institutions across West Africa and potentially leading to more frequent and severe political and military crises.
Domestically, the NDC’s secretive fundraising efforts, possibly tied to promises of lucrative government contracts to Russian businesses, could erode public trust in democratic processes. Such actions can foster a perception of corruption and cronyism that is detrimental to Ghana’s political landscape and global reputation.
Additionally, the involvement of foreign powers in Ghana’s electoral processes poses a direct threat to the sovereignty and independence of Ghana’s policymaking.
Assurances to foreign entities in exchange for campaign support could lead to unfavourable concessions that compromise Ghana’s economic positions on the global stage, particularly in industries critical to its economy such as oil, gold, and cocoa.
